

Spring 2000

COLLOQUIUM 2000: What's the University For?

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Each year the Institute sponsors a colloquium series on an issue or question of importance in contemporary culture. Past years' colloquiums addressed the issues of identity, postmodernity and everyday life, the question of evil, and reconsiderations of diversity. The Institute's colloquium series for Spring 2000 asks the question, "What's the University For?"

At the beginning of a new millennium, the university finds itself puzzled and vexed, in part due to its own achievements. It has reached a level of prestige, wealth, and power that is unrivaled in its history; yet its very accomplishments feed larger anxieties about the university's place and purposes in society as a whole. Our colloquium series seeks to explore and understand the challenges facing higher education in a rapidly changing culture.

This year, instead of a series of monthly lectures, we have put together three one-day colloquiums. Each colloquium will focus on one aspect of the university and include lectures by invited scholars, followed by a panel discussion. In choosing this new format and "the university" as our theme, we hope to encourage focused and interdisciplinary discussion about the changes taking place in higher education and its relation to American society, about the nature of intellectual life inside and outside the academy, and about the culture and politics of university life.

Colloquium One: The Culture of the University (March 2, 2000)

Mark Edmundson (English, UVA) and Jackson Lears (History, Rutgers) will address the question: How have changes in the broader culture affected the culture of the university? A college education has become more integral to social and economic success in our society than ever before, yet this very fact has seemed to infuse (some would say infect) higher education with some of the less attractive aspects of our society, such as consumerism and a

demand for information and entertainment rather than education or wisdom. It is unclear just what an education is meant to do for (or to) the student.

Colloquium Two: University and Public Intellectuals (March 30, 2000)

Gerald Graff (Dean, U. Illinois-Chicago), Russell Jacoby (History, UCLA), and Ross Posnock (English, U. Washington) will examine the roles, relationships, and responsibilities of university and public intellectuals. The university is increasingly the locus of intellectual endeavors, but the structures of university life have led some to wonder if the academy turns potential intellectuals into bureaucrats with critical faculties so specialized that they can gain little purchase on the pressing issues of our times. Some wonder, in short, whether the academy has not in fact rendered "the life of the mind" irrelevant to the wider society.


Colloquium Three: The Moral Purposes of the University (April 13, 2000)

Julie Reuben (Education, Harvard), George Marsden (History, Notre Dame), and Richard Rorty (Comparative Literature, Stanford) will discuss current concerns about the moral purposes of the university. The university came to prominence professing a mission to create "enlightened individuals" by educating them in the liberal arts, and motivated by a commitment to follow inquiry wherever it might lead. The very ideals the university once professed, however, are no longer the content of an avowed faith, but rather the objects of skeptical critique, and some challenge the idea that the university needs any sort of shared moral commitment at all.

All colloquiums are free and open to the public. Please contact the Institute for more information on specific times and locations.

Globalization: The Human Consequences

Zygmunt Bauman—New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. 127 pp.



Globalization, writes noted sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman, “is on everybody’s lips; a fad word fast turning into a shibboleth, a magic incantation, a pass-key meant to unblock the gates to all present and future mysteries.” In this slim but detailed history, Bauman takes up the task of dispelling the mists in which the term is so often shrouded.

What sets this book apart from the recent avalanche of scholarly and journalistic books and articles on globalization is Bauman’s consideration of the *actual human* consequences which are so

often overlooked by globalization’s theorists and its promoters—those relatively few people at “the top” of the new social hierarchy who stand to benefit most from the globalizing process. Against their energetic and enthusiastic embrace of globalization’s promise of more freedom, more choices, and more knowledge for all, Bauman offers an assessment of the darker side of this world-historical change. He unpacks the social roots of globalization and


traces its consequences for economy, politics, social organization, and culture. Taking in turn themes commonly associated with the phenomenon—from the changing ways people experience time and space, to the fading functionality of the nation-state, to the ways in which “locality” or “place” lose their meaning-generating capacity—Bauman shows how human control of events is being lost rather than gained, how we can only watch as borders, institutions, and allegiances constantly shift in unpredictable ways.

While he ultimately raises more questions about the human consequences than he answers, his conclusions are powerful and arresting. He paints a somber picture of a new world order in which the unprecedented prosperity and progress of a few comes at the expense of an expropriation of agency from the many and even a criminalization of those who, lacking the resources to be “on the move,” are simply “in the way.” For most people in the world, he argues, globalization means greater insecurity, uncertainty, and fear, and, very likely, less freedom, less choice, and less meaningful information. Against the uncritical celebration of globalization, Bauman offers a sobering and needed corrective.

Joshua J. Yates, an Associate Fellow, is a doctoral candidate in sociology. For the past two years, he has worked as a research associate on the U.S. site study of the Cultural Globalization Project.

Country of Exiles

William Leach—New York: Pantheon, 1999. 273 pp.



From the author of the pathbreaking *Land of Desire* comes a new study which is not so much a scholarly history (as was its predecessor) as an “informed reflection” on social and economic changes that are dramatically weakening the fabric of place in American life. Leach distinguishes his notion of “place” from “community,” a term now widely used with little reference to geographic locality, and from the concept of place used by nature writers who define “property” or “nature” apart from shared history, traditions, and memories. The meaning of place for Leach is geographical, historical, and

enduring. From the neighborhood to the whole country, place is something people create in time, and from which they draw a sense of connection and achievement. In American history, Leach argues, a strong practice of place-making worked as a countervailing force to the country’s ongoing emphasis on mobility and improvisation and permitted a powerful sense of rootedness and national identity to take shape.

Over the past two decades, however, this countervailing force has been sharply attenuated. The causes are many, but Leach makes

a compelling case for three, all related to fundamental shifts in the character of the American economy. The integrity of local places has been challenged by the new global economic order and the accompanying expansion of transportation systems—land, sea, and air—to move the goods. The connection of individuals to local communities has been altered by a new “landscape of the temporary,” peopled with large numbers of “floating executives” and contingent workers, and physically embodied in temporary housing arrangements from “extended-stay hotels” to trailer parks. Finally, the settled character of many local communities has been permanently disrupted by the expansion of the service sector, especially in the key industries of tourism and gambling.

In tandem with these changes, Leach identifies the emergence of a new cosmopolitanism. Articulated by both business elites and academic elites (housed at the research universities which have themselves been busy adopting “global agendas” and fostering a “placeless” orientation), this cosmopolitanism provides the theoretical and ideological rationalization for the destruction of all boundaries and all conventional and historical conceptions of loyalty and place.

Provocative and challenging, *Country of Exiles* raises important questions about what losing a sense of place means for us as individuals and as a society.

Joseph E. Davis is Program Director of the Institute and a research assistant professor of sociology.

The Cultural Globalization Project

In the last issue of InSight, we reported on the Institute's participation in a large-scale research initiative known as the Cultural Globalization Project. Directing the U.S. component of the 10-nation study, James Davison Hunter (Institute Director) and Joshua Yates (Associate Fellow) have conducted interviews with top executives at many major U.S. organizations with worldwide operations, including in business, finance, media, philanthropy, and religion. The study's aim is to understand the worldview and experience of these important agents of global social change. The following is a summary of their report of preliminary findings.

The World of the Globalizers

The global executives we interviewed live and work in a world made up of constant travel between the major global metropolitan centers—Tokyo, New York, London, Hong Kong, and Los Angeles. They spend no less than a third of their time abroad. When abroad, most respondents tend to interact and socialize with other “globalizers,” whether American or other nationals (highly trained, often Western-educated, English-speaking elites of other countries). They do so in the surroundings that they are familiar with here in the U.S. Wherever they go, the hotels, health clubs, restaurants, offices, and airports are all virtually identical. There is a sense in which they inhabit a socio-cultural bubble that is insulated from the harsher differences between national cultures. This is only reinforced linguistically, as few find any need to speak a language other than English. For this reason, it is rare that they experience tension or contradiction in the environments that define their life and work. For all of their worldliness, the vanguard of globalization never really leaves home. They are cosmopolitan to be sure, but in ways that are very limited and insular.

This is not to say that there aren't differences of worldview among various globalizers. Those who operate in what Peter Berger calls “the faculty club internationale” of human rights organizations and other NGOs, view the world in strikingly different ways from global economic elites, as the hostilities in Seattle, Washington attest. So too, evangelical Christian globalizers have very different personal values and commitments. Even so, all globalizers participate in cultural practices—the habits of

life and mind and circumstance—that are so homogenous as to render these differences virtually inconsequential.

Perhaps the central unifying feature of the globalizers' experience and worldview is the global market itself. Whether they are proponents of a humanitarian mission, advocates of religious faith, sponsors of popular culture, or marketers of a new technology, they articulate their role in terms of creating a global “product” that satisfies some specific human need. Their strategy, in every case, is to develop critical mass for this product through new communication technologies and mass marketing techniques.

There are personal and political ramifications to the fact that the global marketplace operates more and more as their dominant frame of reference. On both counts, it diminishes their attachments to their national identity or local circumstances. As one AT&T executive put it, they “would consider themselves sort of citizens of the world who happen to carry an American passport.” They don't see themselves as “American” in a way that is substantively meaningful to their own personal identity.

What is more, they believe that the extent to which they are perceived as “American” around the world does nothing but impede their organizational mission. In light of this, they see national boundaries and nation-states as increasingly irrelevant to the main action of life in the twenty-first century.

As a Nike executive said, “the only people who will care about national boundaries are politicians.” Thus, while national borders and politics are regarded as necessary, the globalizers we interviewed regard them as less and less so, as far as the movement of world history is concerned.

The Emerging Global Village

Needless to say, “going global” means different things for different organizations. Yet common to all is a belief that globalization is inevitable. The metaphor that is implied again and again is that of a train leaving its station or a ship leaving its port and this train or this ship having a mind of its own. Companies or nations can either “go global” or be left behind.

The burden upon the “third world” and emerging markets is especially heavy in the view of these elites. If a nation, for some reason, chooses not to globalize, they will lose out. As a Merrill Lynch executive put it: “They

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The Cultural Globalization Project *(continued from page 3)*

will lose the economic and technological capacity which will allow them to grow and expand and educate their children and feed their people and essentially move forward to the next stage of development. Third world countries, if that term is still used, who are not linking up to this new global economy are going to clearly remain behind with respect to all the fundamental needs and necessities that their population requires to have a decent quality of life....”

The idea that a nation would not want to catch this train is unthinkable to these globalizing elites precisely because they equate globalization with human progress and enlightenment. The executives we interviewed are uniform in their optimism about the new world that is unfolding; indeed, they are nearly utopian. An executive from CNN declared that in the future, “People will be closer together than ever before. Walls that exist today ... will come down.... There will always be conflict and there will be wars here and there, but with any luck, these will diminish over time as globalization sets in.”

In the view of an AT&T executive, globalization “promises to bring the information-rich centers of the world to places that are information-poor today, so that people all over the world would have access to the same information. That has tremendous benefits to the citizens of the world.” From the democratization of information, it is believed, flows political democratization. This same executive challenged us to think about the liberating impact that these technologies deliver: “If you think of the fax machines that were running during the Beijing Tiananmen Square situation, if you think of what [impact] access to information has had on the Soviet Union, if you just think about the capability and the potential for a lot of walls falling down and arbitrary political boundaries becoming transparent....” In this way, globalization is finally regarded as the path to greater freedom (through democracy), opportunity (through free markets) and quality of life (through expanded human rights) for the world’s population.

Indeed, most respondents had a difficult time seeing that globalization and, in particular, the promotion of their “product,” might also unintentionally “carry” additional cultural baggage that non-Western or non-American cultures would find objectionable and that may cause international tension. The responsibility to regulate the effects of globalization or to defend their traditions must be shouldered by local cultures. “We’re content neutral,” claims the AT&T respondent. “We don’t attempt,” he continued, “to police content and in terms of development of public policy, we try to separate the carriage from content, and the extent to which content needs to be regulated or it needs to

be censored is something that governments need to do with the content providers....” In addressing the problems created by using Indonesian labor, a Nike executive claimed that this was merely a public relations problem.

By the same token, there is tremendous pressure for local cultures everywhere not only to deregulate their markets but also to remove any other restrictions, be they economic, political, or cultural, which might interfere with a society’s global development. For example, the Merrill Lynch respondent pointed to how the traditional Japanese

mindset towards security, saving for the future, and thrift—values which translate into, among other things, care for the elderly—has become a hindrance to full integration into global markets. “In this increasingly interdependent world,” he argued, “as long as the Japanese continue to pursue their historic cultural ideals in traditional ways, they will fail to achieve them. To succeed, they will have to play by new rules which are determined not by Japanese culture, but by the market itself; indeed, there is a cul-

tural logic to these markets that ‘knows best.’ Safety, saving for the future, and thrift are therefore replaced by risk, entrepreneurial spiritedness, and consumption. The minute we start to draw boundaries and regulate, freedoms and opportunities are lost—profit is lost.”

Globalization as Moral Exercise

From all of our interviews thus far, perhaps the most striking feature of globalization’s vanguard is the sense of moral innocence they maintain about the world they are helping to create. All of these globalizers quickly deny the charge that they or their organizations are involved in a “soft colonialism.” But there is more to their sense of innocence than this. Cynicism is simply absent; instead, guilelessness—about who they are and what they are bringing about—is the overwhelming sensibility, one that runs in tandem with their optimism about the future. In particular, there is an undeniable consciousness shared by all that underneath their various organizational missions—whether they be commercial, entertainment, religious, or educational—lies a larger humanitarian conviction that they are meeting a fundamental and universal human need, even if they are simultaneously creating that need. More often than not, such a need is framed in terms of a vague and often poorly articulated notion of individual “well-being.” Thus, in ways they are not always reflective about, they want to believe that they and their work provide a moral good. (The social bubble they inhabit only reinforces this understanding.) The market idiom common to all is, then, fused in peculiar and varied ways with an almost equally pervasive therapeutic idiom. At the start of the twenty-first century, these are the defining marks of human progress.

The Death Of Character by James Davison Hunter

*Editor's Note: In April of this year, Basic Books will publish **The Death of Character** by Institute Director, James Davison Hunter. In this work, Hunter provides a historical and sociological examination of character at the turn of the century and the means by which we endeavor to cultivate it among children. His work finds a context in Daniel Bell's discussion of the cultural contradictions of capitalism and related analyses by Nietzsche, Rieff, Lasch, MacIntyre, and Taylor. Is it any surprise, he asks, that the cultural dynamics they describe play out in the moral culture we have created and are passing on to our young? What follows is a brief excerpt from the book's prologue.*

Character is formed in relation to convictions and is manifested in the capacity to abide by those convictions even in, especially in, the face of temptation. This being so, the demise of character begins with the destruction of creeds—the convictions—and of the “god-terms” that made those creeds sacred to us and inviolable within us.

This destruction occurs simultaneously with the rise of “values.” Values are truths that have been deprived of their commanding character. They are substitutes for revelation, imperatives that have dissolved into a range of possibilities. The very word “value” signifies the reduction of truth to utility, taboo to fashion, conviction to mere preference; all provisional, all exchangeable. Both “values” and “lifestyle,” a way of living that reflects the accumulation of one’s values, bespeak a world in which nothing is sacred. Neither word carries the weight of conviction; the commitment to truths made sacred. Indeed, sacredness is conspicuous in its absence. There is nothing there that one need believe, commanding and demanding its due, for “truth” is but a matter of taste and temperament. Formed against a symbolic order made up of “values” and differing “lifestyles” is the Self—malleable, endlessly developing, consuming, realizing, actualizing, perfecting—but again, something less than character.

The implications are simultaneously liberating and disturbing. There is unprecedented individual freedom that few would be willing to relinquish. But there is also a license that disparages self-restraint and responsibility toward others. This ambivalence is an inescapable feature of our time. They are fused inextricably.

Whatever benefits such a fluid and temporary moral universe may offer, they fail to lessen our dismay when we witness random and senseless violence; our outrage when we see open displays of corruption; our indignation when we observe a flouting of basic standards of decency; and our sadness as we watch callousness when compassion and mercy cry out. But why should we be surprised? When the self is stripped of moral anchoring, there is nothing to which the will is bound to submit, nothing innate to keep it in check. There is no compelling reason to be burdened by guilt. Dostoyevsky had it about right: everything becomes possible—every violence, every deed of corruption, every mockery of justice, every act of indifference—because there are no inhibiting truths. What is more, the indigenous moral institutions of our society that have long sustained those truths are fragile at best; irreparable at worst.

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The causes of our dilemma have little to do with individual moral failure. This is an important point. There are, in fact, larger historical forces at work. The demands of multinational capitalism, for example, have created conditions that make a coherent self that unites history, community, and subjectivity all but impossible. Pluralism and social mobility undermine the plausibility and coherence

of personal beliefs and their capacity to provide a stable sense of meaning. A steady diet of the contemporary communications media and popular culture undermines our very sense of what is real. The list of factors contributing to this dilemma is formidable; against any of them, individuals have little control.

At the same time, character in America has not died a natural death. There has been an ironic and unintended complicity among the very people who have taken on the task of being its guardians and promoters. Some are clearly hucksters, hawking techniques of moral improvement for profit in the swarming and ever-changing values market. Most, however, are deeply earnest, motivated by a belief that if we just try hard enough and work together, we can somehow fill the values deficit that has occurred in our culture in recent decades. All offer quick bromides

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Krishan Kumar on English National Identity

In addition to a small academic staff and affiliated graduate students, a number of University of Virginia faculty participate with the Institute in various capacities. Krishan Kumar, Professor of Sociology, is one of these “faculty fellows.” Before coming to Virginia, Dr. Kumar was Professor of Social and Political Thought at the University of Kent at Canterbury, England. His research has been concerned with the direction of modern societies and his books have explored such wide-ranging topics as the idea of progress, utopias, revolutions, post-industrialism, and postmodernism. In this interview, he discusses his current work at the intersection of debates about globalization, localization, and the sources of identity.

What is the focus of your current research?

I am working on the question of English national identity, why the English don't have an idea of themselves. Most Americans, if you ask, “Do you have a sense of what it is to be American?” will give you some kind of answer. You ask the same of the English, and for them, it's a very puzzling question. They've never had to ask themselves, what is the English nation? Now, for the first time, they are because they're faced with parts of the United Kingdom wanting to rush off, like the Scots, the Welsh, and, of course, the Irish. Then there's Europe trying to absorb Britain. It has created a huge crisis of the national consciousness. So, I'm joining a very current debate, but the way I'm doing it is as a piece of historical sociology, drawing on the work of historians, English writers—such as Jane Austen, E. M. Forster, and George Eliot—and, of course, theories of nationalism and national identity. I'm asking: Why is it that the English have never before had to face this problem? How are they now coming to terms with it?

What's your hunch?

I think the clue to the English is their imperial past. I'm finding increasingly interesting the comparisons between England and Russia. Both the Russians and the English have had huge empires, and they buried themselves in their empires without having to think very much about who they were separately from the empires. Further, the English and the Russians have had strong state traditions and their identities have come as often as not from the state—the monarchy, the Tsar—and usually in tandem with a state church—the Church of England, the Russian Orthodox church.

There hasn't really been a stress on the people or “the nation.” In the United States, by contrast, the society has been much more closely identified with “the people” (not in an ethnic sense, but in a civic one). This has meant that the same kinds of questions that were asked in classic nationalist movements: Who are we? Where did we come from? Where are we going? have already been asked in America, but far less so in England and Russia, until relatively recently, anyway.

If the loss of empire provokes the question of national identity, doesn't the globalizing process attenuate it?

Yes and no. In one sense national identity is less important than it used to be. People have other objects on which to focus their loyalty and gain a sense of identity—region and locality as much as race or gender or, in some cases, identification with the whole biosphere. But for some groups—the less educated, the less skilled—the opportunities and spaces opened up by globalization are very threatening, and for them national identification becomes very important. This is partly, I think, why we're seeing an upsurge in nationalism now, including in England. Globalization actually stimulates nationalism because globalization is very uneven and some groups and regions are reacting by discovering or rediscovering “the nation.”

How is this question of identity expressed among ordinary citizens?

A good example is the death of Princess Diana, which crystallized this question of, “What kind of a community are we?” because the English themselves were astonished at their responses. They began to act in ways that none of them had suspected they could act—like, for instance, having strong feelings. It was a really important moment, which has continued. Everybody said, “Oh, well, it will be over in a year, and people will go back to being the kind of English they were before.” It hasn't happened, and I think her death did act as a cathartic experience to open up all sorts of issues for average citizens that had been buried beneath the surface. We, that is, the English, don't have the concepts and vocabulary, however, for talking about these issues. I hope that my research and the book it produces will help to fill some of that need.

The Hedgehog Review

From the Spring 2000 issue on Democracy:


“An anemic and faltering democratic faith—a decline of confidence in our basic institutions—threatens to render us incapable of sustaining these institutions over the long haul.”

—Jean Bethke Elshtain

“...two fears—about the loss of self-government and the erosion of community and moral authority—define the anxiety of the age.”

—Michael Sandel

Is democracy—an Enlightenment-era institution—sustainable in an increasingly post-Enlightenment public culture? And if so, on what terms? Does democracy require a coherent public philosophy, or is it enough to establish a consensus on democratic procedures? The Spring 2000 issue of *THE HEDGEHOG REVIEW: Critical Reflections on Contemporary Culture* addresses these and other questions with Jean Bethke Elshtain on democratic authority; Richard Horner on maintaining the trajectory of freedom; John Gray on two liberalisms of fear; Richard Sennett on the new political economy; Michael Sandel on the politics of public identity; and John Patrick Diggins on proceduralism, pragmatism, and postmodernity. This issue also includes an interview with Michael Walzer, a review essay on two recent books on democracy, and an annotated bibliography.



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The Death of Character *(continued from page 5)*

on how to raise a moral child, how to give your child great self-esteem, how to raise decent kids, and how to prepare kids for adolescence. But whether sincere or cynical, this mixed array of moral guardians in itself demonstrates our incapacity to cultivate the character for which they call. The end is the reduction of moral exhortation into a peddling of sterile abstractions, weary platitudes, and empty maxims: "Be cool, follow the rules," "Just say no," "Just say yes," "Just don't do it," "Do the right thing."

More ironic still is the complicity of the moral education establishment, those who have given their professional life to the task of moral education. Their mission, of course, is to bring about moral improvement in children and in society; to change the world for the better through moral instruction. As it is currently institutionalized, moral education does just the opposite of what it intends. In its present forms, it *undermines* the capacity to form the convictions upon which character must be based if it is to exist at all.

Robert Bellah to Deliver Fall Lecture

The Institute is pleased to announce that Robert N. Bellah, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, will deliver the Fall 2000 Lecture in Culture and Social Theory. Professor Bellah, the author of many distinguished works, is perhaps best known as the senior author of the widely influential *Habits of the Heart* and its companion, *The Good Society*. Look for details of this important event in the next issue of *InSight*.

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